Evaluating the effectiveness of monetary reforms

Using a monthly model of the economy, containing a detailed financial sector, various monetary reforms are evaluated in a stochastic setting. The setting is stochastic because parameters must be estimated from finite data sets and because unexplained residuals exist. The objective function is a single-period, simple quadratic function in income. The problem then reduces to finding the opportunity locus (mean-variance curve) corresponding to each reform; the more effective the reform the more favorable the mean-variance tradeoff. The general finding is that most of the reforms considered are effective, but their impact is not very significant.     

Political Entrepreneurs and the Transfer Demanding Process: Homesteading the Unassigned District

This paper introduces the transfer-demanding entrepreneur to help bridge the gap between static equilibria in an interest group theory of government and process theories. The transfer demanding entrepreneur acts in a creative, discontinuous fashion to organize latent demand for a particular transfer into an effective interest group. The disequilibrating, re-equilibrating transfer demanding entrepreneur provides a theoretical framework for understanding the movement between static political equilibria. This paper considers the transfer demanding entrepreneurship necessary to bring together the western railroads, organized labor, and potential Oklahoma colonists in the passage of white settlement and coal-lease ratification legislation in the Indian Territory.     

Persistence and Change at the Top of the IT Sector

We use the DATAMATION index of the top 50 domestic IT companies (1975–1995) to track persistence and change at the top of the sector. The trends that we uncover are increasing instability, rejuvenation (declining average age of entrants coupled with increasing average age of quitters), democratization (diminishing revenue inequality at the top) and growing supply‐side intertwining of sub‐sectors and industries within IT due to diversification by long‐term survivors.     

Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power

Summary. If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y). Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997